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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
EDWARD ALLEN BUCK, : Case No. 20070534-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Theft, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Terry L. 
Christiansen presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). £ee Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred by denying Buck's motion to arrest judgment 
because the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during its closing rebuttal that 
prejudiced Buck's case. 
Standard of Review: This Court will review the trial court's denial of a 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment based on prosecutorial misconduct "for abuse of 
discretion." State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264,TJ10, 167 P.3d 516 (citation omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 235-36 (Motion to Arrest Judgment); 
239-53 (Memorandum in Support); 286:8-14 (Motion Hearing). 
Issue II: Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Buck's conviction for 
theft, where the State failed to prove that Buck took the computer with the specific intent 
to commit theft and not with an honest belief that he had an ownership interest in the 
computer or that his business partner would not object to his taking it. 
Standard of Review: This Court will reverse if it concludes "as a matter of law that 
the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 
136,^10, 2 P.3d 954 (citations omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 287:162-63 (motion for directed verdict 
and to dismiss). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules decide the issues on 
appeal: Utah Const, art. VIII, sec. 9 (1971); Utah Const, art. VIII (Supp. 1984); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-502 (2003) (affirmative defenses); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (2003) 
(affirmative defenses for theft); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003) (theft); Utah R. Crim. 
P. 24 (motion for new trial); Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and 
counsel). Their text is provided in full in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Buck was charged with one count of Theft, a class A misdemeanor. R. 1-2; 180; 
181-82. The probable cause statement charged him with taking a computer. R. 182. It 
did not charge him with taking any software or software licenses. R. 182. On April 13, 
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2006, the trial court held a preliminary hearing and bound Buck over for trial. R. 36-37. 
On April 4, 2007, a jury trial was held. R. 228-32; 287. During its opening 
statement, the State accused Buck of taking the computer, but not of taking any software 
or licenses. R. 287:33-37. In his opening statement, Buck told the jury that it should 
acquit because he believed the computer was "partnership property" and that he was the 
only person who used the computer. R. 287:39. Thus, he did not have the requisite 
intent for theft because he had an honest belief that he had an ownership interest in it or 
that Myers, if present, "would have consented to this arrangement where he was going to 
take the computer." R. 287:38. 
During direct examination, Myers said that he was not sure what software 
programs were on the computer because his son "had to rebuild the computer several 
times from viruses." R. 287:57-58, 59. Typically, however, his son installed "Microsoft 
Office XP and Microsoft Office 2003 Professional and then Adobe Acrobat Professional" 
on newly-rebuilt computers. R. 287:57-58, 63-64. Whatever software was installed on 
the computer, he paid for and owned those programs and their licenses. R. 287:58. He 
also paid for the account that provided "internet access" on the computer. R. 287:73-74. 
At the close of evidence, Buck moved for a directed verdict and to dismiss 
because the State did not "prove beyond a reasonable doubt" that he did not have an 
"honest belief that he had "a right to obtain or exercise control over" the computer and 
that Myers "if present would have consented." R. 287:162. The trial court denied the 
motion because, "It seems to me it's a fact issue as to whether or not there was the honest 
3 
belief. I'm going to ask the jury to decide." R. 287:163; see Addendum C. 
Following the trial court's instructions to the jury, the parties gave closing 
arguments. Originally, the State said the case "really comes down to" whether Buck had 
"the intent to permanently deprive Mr. Myers of the computer," or whether he acted "in 
honest belief that he could take" the computer. R. 287:175. It then argued that the jury 
should convict because it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Buck did not have "an 
honest belief." R. 287:178. The State did not mention any software or software licenses. 
R. 287:172-78. 
In response, Buck argued that the jury should acquit because the State did not 
disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 287:179-85. 
Specifically, the State did not disprove his claim that he had an "honest belief that he 
had "a right to ownership in the property" and that Myers "would have consented" if he 
"had been present." R. 287:181. Rather, the evidence was "pretty clear that he did have 
the honest belief." R. 287:181. The "partnership was dissolving" and Buck thought it 
was better to go than to stay and continue the "disputes." R. 287:182. So he left, taking 
the computer because he had an honest belief that he was entitled to take it and leaving a 
letter explaining the situation and agreeing to pay for the computer. R. 287:182. Then, 
when the police informed him that they believed he was not entitled to the computer, he 
"was upset" because he did not want to lose "his work product," but "he cooperated," 
provided a copy of the "letter he had left Mr. Myers," and "helped carry [the computer] 
out to the vehicle." R. 287:183. 
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Finally, during rebuttal, the State said: 
Who did the operating system belong to? Who owned the licenses of 
those items. [Buck] can't own the licenses for those items. Those 
were owned by Mr. Myers. Mr. Myers didn't have the ability to give 
them up even if (inaudible). They were operating systems on there, 
Windows Microsoft Word, Acrobat Adobe, again these are things you 
can't just give away. All the components were (inaudible). So, just 
'cause you used it and needed it, that's not sufficient basis to have an 
honest belief. 
R. 287:187; see Addendum D. Buck did not have an opportunity to respond to this 
argument. R. 287:190. 
Following the parties' arguments, the jury retired to deliberate. R. 287:190. After 
more than three hours of deliberating, the trial court gave the jury an "additional 
instruction." R. 287:191. In this instruction, the trial court said, "There is no reason to 
suppose that this case will be submitted to six more intelligent or more impartial or more 
competent jurors or to more or clearer evidence will be produced on one side o[r] the 
other." R. 287:191. Thus, the trial court encouraged the jurors "to decide this case if you 
can without yielding your conscience convictions." R. 287:191. "If a larger number of 
your panel are for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether the doubt in his 
or her mind is a reasonable one if it makes no impression on the minds of so many other 
jurors who are equally honest and intelligent and heard the same evidence and taken the 
same oath." R. 287:191-92. "On the other hand, if a larger number of your panel are for 
acquittal, the minority should ask themselves whether they ought to reasonably doubt 
seriously the correctness of judgment which is not concurred in by most of those with 
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whom they are associated and distrust the weight and sufficiency of the evidence which 
calls to carry conviction to the minds of fellow jurors." R. 287: 192. The jury then 
resumed its deliberation. R. 287:192. 
After forty more minutes of deliberating, the trial court gave the jury yet another 
instruction. R. 287:192. "If this case can be resolved, I think it's in everybody's best 
interest that it be resolved. On the other hand, if it can't be resolved, believe me, I think 
all of us here appreciate that and want to acknowledge how hard you've been working on 
it." R. 287:193. After the foreperson indicated that he believed "maybe another half an 
hour" would be enough to reach a verdict, the jury again returned to deliberation. R. 
287:193-94. After nearly another forty minutes of deliberating, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty. R. 226; 287:194-95. 
On May 18, 2007, Buck filed a motion to arrest judgment. R. 235-36. First, he 
argued that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing rebuttal when 
it argued the jury should convict him because he stole software and licenses in addition to 
the computer. R. 242-44. This deprived Buck of his constitutional right to receive notice 
of the charges against him and to have the opportunity to defend against those charges. 
R. 242-44. Second, Buck argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a theft 
conviction because it did not show he had the specific intent to commit theft. R. 244-47. 
Following oral argument, the trial court denied Buck's motion. R. 269; 286:8-14. 
A sentencing hearing was held on June 6, 2007. R. 269. The trial court ordered 
Buck to serve a term of 365 days, suspended the jail term, and placed him on probation 
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for 12 months. R. 270-71. The trial court also ordered Buck to pay a $2,500 fine with 
$2,000 of the fine suspended. R. 270. Buck filed a timely notice of appeal on June 27, 
2007. R. 274. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Buck invented a bitless bridle. R. 287:134. When he met Myers in San Diego, he 
told Myers about his invention. R. 287:50. Later, when Buck had car trouble during a 
trip to Utah, Myers invited Buck to stay in his basement rent-free and offered to help 
Buck get back on his feet. R. 287:51-52. 
After Buck had lived in Myers' basement for "several months," Buck and Myers 
entered into a partnership called Supreme Cavalry. R. 287:51-52. The purpose of this 
partnership was to "start up a website" where they could sell Buck's bridles. R. 287:51. 
At trial, the men agreed that the partnership was divided "50/50," with Myers providing 
the financing and building the website, and Buck providing the bridle plans and selling 
the bridles. R. 287:53-54, 72, 92, 133, 153. 
They disagreed, however, about whether the partnership agreement was oral or 
written. Myers said the agreement was written and produced what he claimed was the 
written document. R. 287:113; see State's Exhibit 4. In fact, he claimed that all of their 
agreements were in writing, despite acknowledging that their agreement about his wife's 
position in the partnership was not in writing. R. 287:160-61. On the other hand, Buck 
said their partnership agreements, including those concerning the computer, were oral. R. 
287:149-50. 
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The men also disagreed about the ownership of the computer. Myers claimed that 
the computer was not an asset of the partnership. R. 287:59. Rather, he owned it 
himself, had it "networked" to his other computers, and claimed it on his taxes. R. 
287:57-58, 112. At trial, Myers stipulated that "[t]he forensic examination of the data" 
on the computer's "hard drive did not reveal any data or files that appeared to belong to 
anyone other than [Buck]." R. 287:62. Regardless, he claimed the computer was "the 
common computer" in his house, and every member of his family had used it "at one 
time or another." R. 287:58-59. Myers said he gave Buck permission to use the 
computer to work on his lawsuit, but he did not agree to give or sell the computer to 
Buck. R. 287:73, 75, 90. He also did not give Buck permission to take the computer 
from his house. R. 287:65, 71. l 
To the contrary, Buck believed that the computer was an asset of the partnership. 
R. 287:143-44. He thought that Myers built the computer "exclusively" for his use so 
that he could "get the lawsuit filed." R. 287:142, 147. In other words, his 
"understanding" was that Myers "put the computer together . . . for me and gave it to me . 
. . because we had an agreement with the lawsuit and then subsequent agreement with the 
Spirit Supreme Cavalry that it was part of a partnership." R. 287:143-44. Buck reached 
this belief because when he first saw the computer, it was in pieces and was only 
1
 At trial, Myers stipulated that the computer was worth between $300 and $1000. R. 
287:61. At the preliminary hearing, however, he testified that it was worth much more. 
287:181; Defendant's Exhibit 1. 
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assembled "a couple of weeks" after he and Myers "had gotten together."2 R. 287:150-
51. And the computer did not appear to be networked to the other computers because he 
never saw anyone else use it and, as corroborated by the forensic testing, it did not 
contain anyone else's files. R. 287:62, 143, 154. 
Further, the men disagreed about the necessity of Buck's lawsuit. Buck's lawsuit 
involved the patent for the bridle. R. 287:72, 88. As Buck explained, he was suing the 
man that had stolen the design for the bitless bridle. R. 287:135-36. Even though the 
lawsuit involved the patent for the bridle, Myers said the lawsuit was not necessary to the 
partnership and they did not have any agreement regarding the lawsuit. R. 287:72, 88, 
159. Conversely, Buck said Myers had agreed to "provide [him] with a computer and the 
means to fight the lawsuit," and, in exchange, Myers "would get 10 percent of the 
lawsuit." R. 287:136-37. 
As part of the partnership, Myers and Buck opened a joint banking account. R. 
287:105-06. Myers also opened a business account, but Buck's name was not on that 
account. R. 287:105-06. Instead, Myers' wife's name was on the account. R. 287:105-
07. Myers claimed that the bank would not permit Buck's name to be put on the account. 
R. 287:105-06. Myers testified that he and Buck both agreed to put $100 into the joint 
bank account, but Buck never contributed his share. R. 287:54. 
Buck, whose duty it was to sell bridles, spoke to companies about manufacturing 
2
 Myers acknowledged that the computer got several viruses and had to be rebuilt by his 
son. R. 287:63. 
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them. R. 287:85, 92. At trial, he explained that he could not sell the bridles until they 
were manufactured because people will not buy a horse product that is not available for 
purchase "then and there." R. 287:139. He told Myers that in order to sell bridles they 
needed to manufacture bridles and to use his horse for demonstrations. R. 287:141-42. 
But Myers, whose duty it was to finance the partnership, never had any bridles 
manufactured. R. 287:85, 92. Instead, the partnership ordered four prototypes, which 
had defects and were reworked locally. R. 287:93, 140. Buck took these prototypes to 
two trade shows, but did not sell any bridles. R. 287:110. 
After several months passed and no bridles sold, Myers told Buck that he needed 
to start paying rent. R. 287:54. Buck obtained work as a live-in caretaker and moved out 
of Myers' basement. R. 287:55. But the partnership still existed and, in January 2005, 
Buck deposited his first paycheck into the joint account. R. 287:55, 89. Myers did not 
consider this financial support of the partnership because Buck "withdrew more money 
than . . . he'd deposited." R. 287:75. 
After Buck moved out, he still had permission to use the computer. He used the 
computer "about two times a week" from "around 8:00 in the morning until 1:00 in the 
afternoon." R. 287:55, 89. As Myers explained, he "always let" Buck use the computer 
to "do his lawsuit stuff." R. 287:64-65. 
From August 19-28, 2005, Myers went on vacation and left Buck in charge of his 
pets. R. 287:64. As usual, Buck had permission to use the computer. R. 287:64-65. 
When Myers returned, the computer was gone. R. 287:66. On the kitchen counter, he 
10 
found a letter from Buck. R. 287:65; see State's Exhibit 3; Addendum E. In it, Buck 
explained why he was unhappy with the partnership, ended the partnership, and asked 
Myers to give him the "receipts for expenses," shut down the website, and return the 
website photographs. R. 287: 65-66, 111; see State's Exhibit 3. He also said that he was 
taking "the computer because it had all his personal stuff on it and that he would pay 
[Myers] fair market value when he received appropriate funds." R. 287:65-66, 111; see 
State's Exhibit 3. Then, Buck signed his name and provided a Las Vegas address, but did 
not provide a telephone number or say what price he would pay for the computer or when 
he would pay. R. 287:66-67, 76-78, 111, 153; see State's Exhibit 3. 
Buck conceded that he did not consult with Myers about taking the computer, that 
he took the computer while Myers was gone, and that he did not have a receipt, contract, 
or bill of sale for the computer. R. 287:153, 158. But he explained that he has no legal 
training and did not believe that he was committing a crime when he took the computer. 
R. 287:144, 148. He said he took the computer while Myers was on vacation because 
Myers left for vacation without ever discussing why he "would not provide the means" 
for them "to go to Kentucky to school the only white stallion thoroughbred in the country 
in dressage and the bridle," even though it was "the opportunity of a lifetime." R. 
287:145. Then, after Myers left, Buck "found out that Supreme Cavalry did not exist in 
[his] name" and that he "was not a party of [his] company." R. 287:145. Consequently, 
he "decided that" he "had no partnership." R. 287:145. He believed that he could leave 
the partnership "by saying I'm leaving it and then any property would have to be divided 
11 
up appropriately," including the computer and "the contents on the hard disk." R. 
287:147-48. Regardless, he left the letter conveying his intent to pay for the computer 
because "even though [Myers had] stolen from me, I wouldn't steal from him." R. 
287:146. In that letter, Buck provided a Nevada address because that was where he 
planned to "set up corporate headquarters." R. 287:158; see State's Exhibit 3. 
When Myers discovered the computer was gone, he called a Las Vegas number 
that Buck had called in the past. R. 287:68. No one answered so Myers called the 
insurance company, which said he would "need to file a police report." R. 287:68-69. 
Myers then called the house where Buck lived as a caretaker and, later, drove to the 
house. R. 287:69-70. There, he saw Buck's car and called the police. R. 287:70, 80. 
After speaking to Myers, Officer Boughn went to the house where Buck lived. R. 
287:117-19. He found Buck outside with two officers that he had sent ahead. R. 
287:119. Buck did not know why the officers were there. R. 287:126. In Buck's words, 
he was "astonished" when the officers came because he did not believe that he had 
committed a crime. R. 287:144. 
Responding to Officer Boughn's questions, Buck said that he and Myers were 
"business partners" and that "he had the computer." R. 287:120. He then "asked if Mr. 
Myers had gotten the letter that he left for him at his house." R. 287:120. As Buck 
retrieved a copy of the letter, Officer Boughn followed him into the house and saw the 
computer. R. 287:120-21. When Officer Boughn asked why Buck had taken the 
computer, Buck answered that "he needed it to continue on with his lawsuit." R. 
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287:122. In response to Officer Boughn's other questions, Buck said he had not bought 
the computer, but that "Myers had built it for him to use." R. 287:122-23. 
Officer Boughn and Officer Brenaman, who arrived on the scene later, believed 
Buck did not have "a right to take the computer from Mr. Myers' residence." R. 287:124, 
128-29; see State's Exhibit 2. Accordingly, Officer Boughn told Buck that he was 
seizing the computer. R. 287:124. Buck "was upset" because "he wanted to immediately 
retrieve some information off the computer," but was compliant. R. 287:125, 126, 130. 
In addition, Officer Brenaman recalled that Buck said "he had an ownership interest in 
the computer and believed he was entitled to retain possession of the computer." R. 
287:130. Officer Brenaman told Buck that he would "need to get a court order" to get the 
files off the computer. R. 287:130. And Buck responded that he would get an attorney to 
help him "recover information" on the computer. R. 287:127. 
Although Officer Boughn could not "remember if Mr. Buck" helped carry the 
computer out of the house, Officer Brenaman recalled Buck "assisting Deputy Boughn by 
carrying the computer out to Deputy Bough's patrol vehicle" and "loading the computer 
into the vehicle." R. 287:124, 130. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial because the State 
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. This Court will reverse where the prosecutor's 
remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and where the jurors, under the circumstances of 
13 
the particular case, were probably influenced by those remarks. The first prong of this 
test is met where prosecutor misstates the law during closing argument or encourages 
jurors to consider matters outside the evidence. Under the second prong, if the evidence 
in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, then the jurors are more likely to 
be influenced by an improper argument. In such cases, once the first prong is established, 
the State must show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In this case, the first prong was met because during its rebuttal, the State 
referenced matters not in evidence and encouraged the jury to reject the affirmative 
defense and convict based on these matters. Step two was also met because the 
misconduct prejudiced Buck's case. The improper argument was raised during rebuttal 
so that Buck did not have the opportunity to respond; the trial court did not provide a 
curative instruction; and the evidence presented at trial was circumstantial and so 
conflicting that the jury was likely influenced by the State's improper argument. 
Second, this Court should reverse because the trial court erred by denying Buck's 
motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. It is fundamental that the State carries the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of an offense, including the 
absence of an affirmative defense. An appellate court will reverse the jury's verdict in a 
criminal case when it concludes that the evidence as a matter of law was insufficient to 
warrant conviction. When the only evidence presented against the defendant is 
circumstantial, the evidence supporting a conviction is insufficient if it does not preclude 
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. A review of Utah case law shows that success 
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under the reasonable hypothesis test often depends on whether the defense is consistent 
with the circumstantial evidence presented at trial. 
In this case, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Buck obtained 
or exercised control over the computer with the specific intent to commit theft, and not 
with an honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the computer 
or that Myers, if present, would have consented. To prove its case, the State relied on 
circumstantial evidence. But this evidence was insufficient to warrant the conviction 
because it did not preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. To the contrary, 
the evidence supported the reasonable hypothesis that Buck acted with an honest belief. 
So much so, in fact, that the jury deliberated for over five hours and required two 
supplemental instructions before it reached a verdict. Thus, this Court should reverse 
without granting the State a retrial. If, however, this Court determines that the reasonable 
hypothesis test was not met, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial because 
the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. This will ensure fairness by 
affording Buck a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment where the verdict was 
based on evidence so weak that it created manifest injustice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND FOR A NEW 
TRIAL BECAUSE THE STATE ENGAGED IN PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT THAT PREJUDICED BUCK'S CASE 
"In our judicial system, 'the prosecution's responsibility is that of "a minister of 
justice and not simply that of an advocate, which includes a duty "to see that the 
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defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of 
sufficient evidence:"" State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349,^17, — P.3d — (quoting Utah 
R. Profl Conduct 3.8 & cmt. 1) (footnotes omitted) (other citation omitted)). "Thus, cthe 
conduct of the prosecutor at closing argument is [appropriately] circumscribed by the 
concern for the right of a defendant to a fair and impartial trial.'" Todd, 2007 UT App 
349 at 1[17 (citations omitted). 
"Prosecutors are held to a high standard regarding their conduct, given 'the 
possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor's arguments, not only 
because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor's office, but also because of the 
fact-finding facilities presumably available to the office.'" Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at 
^17 (quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense 
Function 3-5.8 cmt. (1993)) (other citation omitted). "Thus, while prosecutors must have 
the freedom to present closing argument with logical force, they must also act within the 
constraints imposed upon their office." Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at ^18 (citing Utah R. 
Profl Conduct 3.8 & cmt. 1); see State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89,^154-55, — P.3d 
"Accordingly, ' [t]he prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the 
jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.'" Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at ^ [18 
(quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense 
Function 3-5.8(d) (1993)) (alteration in original). 
When determining "'whether the remarks made by counsel are so objectionable as 
to merit a reversal in a criminal case,'" this Court employs a two-part test: (1) "did the 
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remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict," and (2) were the jurors, "under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by those remarks.'" Ross, 2007 
UT 89 at l[|54 (citation omitted). "This two-part test must be applied 'under the 
circumstances of the particular case.'" Id (citation omitted). 
The "first prong of the prosecutorial misconduct test" is satisfied "[i]f the 
prosecutor misstates the law during closing argument." Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 
2007 UT App 254^18, 167 P.3d 496 (citation omitted). This is because a misstatement 
of the law "necessarily calls the jurors' attention to matters they are not justified in 
considering, thus satisfying the first prong of the prosecutorial misconduct test." Id; see 
also Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at [^28; State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998); State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other 
grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). 
Likewise, the first prong is met if the prosecutor "encourage[s] jurors to consider 
matters outside the evidence." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,1J59, 979 P.2d 799 
(citations omitted); see State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989) ("[C]ounsel is 
precluded from arguing matters not in evidence."); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 344 
(Utah Ct. App.) ("A comment by a prosecutor during closing argument that the jury 
consider matters outside the evidence is prosecutorial misconduct."), cert, denied, 868 
P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). As explained by rule 3.4(e) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, "a lawyer may not 'allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably 
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believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.'" Todd, 2007 
UT App 349 at ^22 (quoting Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 3.4(e)). Thus, "[a] prosecutor's 
'suggestion] to the jury that they consider and "deliberate" matters outside the evidence' 
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct." Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at |^22 (citations 
omitted) (second alteration in original); see State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,^28, 992 P.2d 
951; Christensen, 2007 UT App 254 at If 17. 
When determining the second prong of the prosecutorial misconduct test, this 
Court will "consider the case as a whole." Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at TJ1f33, 35 (citation 
omitted). If "'"proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark will 
not be presumed prejudicial.'"" Ross, 2007 UT 89 at ffl|54-55 (citation omitted); see 
Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at Tfij33, 35 (citation omitted). Moreover, the prejudicial effect 
of improper prosecutorial statements may be reduced if "defense counsel addressed the 
improper statements during closing argument," or if "the trial court gave a curative 
instruction." Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at 1J34 (citation omitted). 
On the other hand, "c[w]hen the evidence in the record is circumstantial or 
sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced by an improper argument.'" Id. 
at [^35 (alteration in original). In such cases, the jurors "may be especially susceptible to 
influence, and a small degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict." State 
v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991). Thus, "'[cjounsel is obligated in such cases to 
avoid, as far as possible, any reference to those matters the jury is not justified in 
considering.'" State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State 
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v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984)). And if "prosecutorial misconduct is 
established, the State must show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Ross, 2007 UT 89 at TI54 (citation omitted). 
In this case, Buck was charged with theft of the computer. R. 1-2; 180; 181-82. 
He was not charged with theft of software or software licenses. R. 1-2; 180; 181-82. 
During presentation of the evidence, the State asked limited questions about software, but 
did not establish what software was on the computer when Buck took it or whether Buck 
somehow took the license rights to that software along with the computer. R. 287:57-59, 
63-64, 73-74. Indeed, the State would have had difficulty establishing such evidence 
because Myers testified that he did not know what software programs were installed on 
the computer. R. 287:57-59. The State also did not introduce the licensing agreements 
for the software installed on the computer to establish whether those agreements 
prevented Myers from giving the software to Buck. R. 287. Even if those licensing 
agreements did expressly prevent Myers from giving the software away, the State did not 
introduce evidence to show that Buck had reviewed those licensing agreements or 
understood that Myers could not give him the software along with the computer. R. 287. 
To the contrary, the uncontested evidence showed that Buck did not have a good 
understanding of computers or software and that what little he did know, he had learned 
from Myers5 children. R. 287:84. 
Despite this lack of evidence, the State claimed during its closing rebuttal that 
Buck had taken the software and the software licenses for the computer's operating 
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system, Microsoft Word, and Adobe Acrobat. R. 287:187. It also claimed that Myers 
could not give the computer to Buck because he could not "give away" the software 
installed on the computer. R. 287:187. Finally, it claimed that Buck knew Myers could 
not give him the computer because he could not give him the software installed on the 
computer. R. 287:187. Tying these unfounded claims together, the State then concluded 
that Buck could not have had an honest belief that he had an ownership interest in the 
computer or that Myers, if present, would not have objected to his taking the computer 
because he and Myers both knew that the software on the computer prevented Myers 
from giving the computer to him. R. 287:187. 
By referencing matters not in evidence and encouraging the jury to reject the 
affirmative defense and convict based on these matters, the State engaged in prosecutorial 
misconduct. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at «[[59; Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at f22; 
Christehsen, 2007 UT App 254 at }^17. Thus, step one of the prosecutorial misconduct 
test is met. See id. 
Step two is also met because the misconduct prejudiced Buck's case. See Ross, 
2007 UT 89 at YJ54-55. Because the State raised its improper argument for the first time 
during its closing rebuttal, Buck had no warning about it and no opportunity to defend 
himself against it. R. 287:187. The State made no mention of the argument during its 
opening statement or closing argument, and did not elicit evidence to support the 
argument while presenting its case. R. 287:57-59, 63-64, 73-74, 172-78. Instead, the 
State waited until its closing rebuttal to make the argument, leaving Buck no opportunity 
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to defend against it. R. 287:187. Further, the trial court offered no curative instruction to 
ensure that the jury knew it should disregard the State's argument. R. 287. 
What is more, this case did not involve strong evidence of guilt. R. 287. To the 
contrary, the State's case relied on circumstantial evidence and the evidence presented at 
trial was so conflicting that the jury was likely influenced by the State's improper 
argument. See Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at Tf35. At trial, the State claimed that Buck took 
the computer with the specific intent to commit theft. Excluding its improper argument 
about the software and licenses, the State based its claim on the following: Buck took the 
computer while Myers was on vacation, he did not have a written agreement for the 
computer, he did not provide a phone number, a price, or a pay-by date in the letter, 
Myers purchased the computer before he arrived, and he did not help pay for the 
computer. R. 287:172-78. 
On the other side, Buck claimed that he took the computer with an honest belief 
that he had an ownership interest in the computer or that Myers, if present, would not 
have objected to his taking it. R. 287:181. In support of this affirmative defense, the 
defense pointed out that Buck left the signed letter dissolving the partnership and 
claiming the computer because he and Myers were experiencing relationship problems 
and he did not want to confront Myers face-to-face. R. 287:182; see State's Exhibit 3. 
He provided a Nevada address in the letter because that was where he was going to 
establish "the new corporation." R. 287:182. He did not provide a price or a pay-by date 
in the letter because he did not know the fair market value of the computer or the "time 
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frame for when it's going to be paid." R. 287:184. He believed the price and time frame 
would be decided later, when he and Myers divided the partnership equally. R. 287:184. 
But the price and time frame were not decided because Myers called the police instead. 
R. 287:184. Lastly, he "cooperated with the police," even though he was upset because 
he did not believe that the police had grounds to seize the computer. R. 287:182-83. 
Additionally, the defense impeached Myers' testimony by showing that Myers' 
claim that all of his agreements with Buck were in writing was contradicted by the fact 
that his wife's participation in the partnership was not in writing, Myers' statement that 
the computer was used by his whole family was contradicted by his stipulation that the 
only data on the computer belong to Buck, and Myers' preliminary hearing testimony 
about the value of the computer was much higher than the actual value of the computer. 
R. 287:180-81. 
This evidence, assuming it was even sufficient to prove the State's case beyond a 
reasonable doubt, was so circumstantial and so contradictory that the jury could easily 
have acquitted. In fact, the record shows that the jury had a very difficult time reaching a 
verdict. R. 287:191-92. It deliberated for more than five hours and wras so divided that 
the trial court had to give two verdict-urging supplemental instructions before it could 
reach a unanimous decision.3 R. 287:191-94. 
Indeed, supplemental instructions like these (often called Allen instructions) have been 
widely criticized because they use coercive means to encourage the jury to reach a verdict 
where it otherwise would not. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992) 
(stating that Allen instructions have been "criticized as tending to pressure jurors into 
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With only circumstantial, highly contradictory evidence to guide the jury, it is 
likely that the State's reference to matters outside the evidence during its closing rebuttal 
improperly influenced the jury's verdict. See Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at [^35. Without 
the State's argument that Buck could not have had an honest belief because he knew the 
software licenses prevented Myers from giving him the computer, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would have believed Buck's claim that he had an honest belief 
and acquitted. R. 287:187. Indeed, defense counsel pointed out in his motion to arrest 
judgment that he had spoken to some jurors following the trial and learned that they 
"found Mr. Buck to be more credible than Mr. Myers," but "the concept of the software, 
the data and information on the hard drive" played "a relevant role" in their ultimate 
verdict. R. 286:11-12. 
giving up their sincere convictions merely because a majority reached a different 
conclusion," but holding any danger of coercion "dissipated" in this case because the 
instruction was "given prior to jury deliberations" (citations omitted)); State v. Thomas, 
777 P.2d 445, 448 (Utah 1989) (holding supplemental instruction was not coercive, and 
noting the "[c]riticism which has been leveled at giving an Allen charge simply is not 
applicable here" because the "instruction was not directed specifically toward the 
minority jurors, nor was there any suggestion that the jurors should surrender their 
individual views of conscience"); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1022 n.l, 1023 (Utah 
1987) (recognizing that "many courts have expressed concern about the continued 
propriety of the [Allen] instruction because of its perceived tendency to pressure jurors to 
give up their sincere convictions simply because a majority takes a different view," but 
ruling that the Allen-charge issue was not properly preserved below); State v. Lactod, 
761 P.2d 23, 30 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that this Court will only approve an Allen 
charge if it is "non-coercive"). 
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II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED BY DENYING BUCK'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
"It is fundamental that the State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt each element of an offense, including the absence of an affirmative defense once 
the defense is put into issue." State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (plurality 
opinion) (citations omitted); see Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-502(2)(b) (2003) (requiring State to 
negate defense "[b]y proof if "defense is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has 
presented evidence of such affirmative defense")- An appellate court will "'reverse the 
jury's verdict in a criminal case when [it] concludefs] as a matter of law that the evidence 
was insufficient to warrant conviction."5 State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,<j|10, 2 
P.3d 954 (citations omitted). 
To prove its case, the State may rely on direct and/or circumstantial evidence. 
See, e.g., State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Direct evidence is 
"[e]vidence that is based on personal loiowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a 
fact without inference or presumption." Black's Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed. 2004). 
Whereas circumstantial evidence is "[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal 
loiowledge or observation." Black's Law Dictionary 595 (8th ed. 2004). 
When the State uses direct evidence to prove its case, then an appellate court will 
"conclude that the evidence was insufficient" to warrant conviction if, "after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
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reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he or she was convicted."' State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,^63, 52 P.3d 
1210 (citations omitted). 
On the other hand, "'[w]here the only evidence presented against the defendant is 
circumstantial/55 then "'the evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.555 State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 7825 786 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting Hill, 727 P.2d at 222) (citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 
(Utah 1976), affd, State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,12, 985 P.2d 911 ("While we find the 
court of appeals5 discussion of the reasonable alternative hypothesis doctrine problematic 
and unnecessary, we do conclude that there was insufficient evidence to convict.55); see 
State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1970). "This is because the existence of a 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt.555 Layman, 953 P.2d at 786 (citations omitted). In other words, "if 
there is any reasonable view of the credible evidence which is reconcilable with the 
defendant's innocence, it would naturally follow that there would be a reasonable doubt 
as to his guilt.55 State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1978). 
The reasonable hypothesis rule does not alter the fact "in this state that 'a 
conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial evidence.555 Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281 
(citations omitted); see State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). This 
is because the rule does not encompass "just any view of any of the evidence, however 
unsubstantial or incredible, which a party to such a controversy may dream up.55 John, 
25 
586 P.2d at 412. Rather, "proper application of th[e] rule requires that it be based upon 
what the jury regards as substantial and credible evidence." IdL; see Lyman, 966 P.2d at 
282 n.3. Likewise, it "does not apply to each circumstance separately." Schad, 470 P.2d 
at 247. Rather, it "is a matter within the prerogative of the jury to determine from all the 
facts and circumstances shown; and if therefrom they are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the defendant's guilt, it necessarily follows that they regarded the evidence as 
excluding every other reasonable hypothesis." Id. If, upon a "review of the evidence, 
and the reasonable inferences fairly to be deduced therefrom," this Court determines "that 
there is no reasonable basis therein for such a conclusion," then this Court will "overturn 
the verdict." Id. (citations omitted). 
A review of Utah case law shows that success under the reasonable hypothesis test 
often depends on whether the defense is consistent with the circumstantial evidence 
presented at trial. See Schad, 470 P.2d at 248 (affirming under reasonable hypothesis test 
"particularly because in those respects where the defendant's story could be checked 
against other credible evidence not affected with self-interest, his story did not jibe with 
other facts shown"). For example, in Hill, our supreme court reversed a burglary 
conviction under reasonable hypothesis test because the "evidence supports" defendant's 
hypothesis that the burglary was committed "without the assistance, encouragement or 
knowledge of [defendant]." Hill, 727 P.2d at 222. Likewise, the court reversed the 
defendants' theft by receiving convictions because the officers' testimony "tended to 
support" defendants' hypothesis that defendant "did not receive the items in which he had 
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shown an interest while he was in the store." Id at 223. Plus, the store owner's 
testimony that defendant "had visited the store and had dealt with her before and that he 
had signed his name and address in the store's register book, simplifying his future 
location and identification, also cast doubt on defendants' guilt." Id. at 223. 
Likewise, in Layman, this Court reversed a constructive possession conviction 
under the reasonable hypothesis test because the defendant "denied he had either drugs or 
alcohol in his vehicle," "did not attempt to flee after being stopped," and "consented to a 
search of himself and his car." Layman, 953 P.2d at 789-90. Consistent with these 
claims, "no drugs were found either in [defendant's] car or on his person," and "[t]he 
State produced no evidence, direct or circumstantial,. . . that [defendant] knew about. . . 
the contents of [the passenger's] pouch, or more importantly, that [defendant] had or 
could have exercised any dominion and control over the contraband in the pouch, or that 
he intended to exercise such control." Id. at 789-90. Compare State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 
1386, 1387-89 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (reversing constructive possession conviction even 
though "defendant owned and occupied" vehicle because his statements denying 
possession were consistent with evidence that he "did not have drugs or drug 
paraphernalia on his person at the time of arrest," his "wife was a co-owner" of the 
vehicle, and "[t]here had been a backseat passenger close to where the drug was found, 
and this passenger was seen moving around in a furtive manner just before the traffic 
stop"); with State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 346 (Utah 1997) (affirming conviction based 
on circumstantial evidence because, among other things, defendant made inconsistent 
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statements to police); State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1234-35 & nn.l, 2 (Utah 1986) 
(affirming jury's inference that possession of stolen property supported theft conviction 
when other evidence, including defendant's inconsistent statements, supported conclusion 
that defendant had stolen the property); and Lyman, 966 P.2d at 282-83 (affirming 
conviction based on circumstantial evidence because, among other things, defendant's 
repeated denials that he went "into the maintenance closet that day" were inconsistent 
with the evidence). 
Ordinarily, to successfully demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to 
warrant conviction, "an appellant must first marshal all the evidence that supports the 
trial court's findings." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44^17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108 (emphasis 
omitted). "After marshaling the supportive evidence, the appellant then must show that, 
even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the 
evidence is insufficient to support" the verdict. Id. (citation omitted). When reviewing a 
circumstantial evidence case, however, the appellant need not show that the evidence was 
"'sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he 
or she was convicted.'" Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at |^63 (citations omitted). Instead, the 
appellant need only show that the evidence did not "'preclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence.'" Layman, 953 P.2d at 786 (citations omitted); see Schad, 470 
P.2d at 247. Thus, it is possible that the marshaling requirement does not apply to 
circumstantial evidence cases. To the extent that it does, however, the marshaled 
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evidence is as follows: 
1. Myers testified that he purchased the computer before Buck arrived and that 
Buck did not help pay for the computer. R. 287:57-59, 112. 
2. Myers testified that the computer was "networked" to his other computers and 
that he claimed it on his taxes. R. 287:57-59, 112. He said the computer was the 
common computer and was used by every member of his family. R. 287:58-59. 
3. Myers said he gave Buck permission to use the computer to work on his 
lawsuit, but did not agree to give or sell the computer to Buck. R. 287:73, 75, 90. He 
also did not give Buck permission to take the computer from his house. R. 287:65, 71. 
4. Myers testified that all of his agreements with Buck were in writing and that he 
did not have a written agreement giving the computer to Buck. R. 287:160-61. 
5. Myers said that Buck still had permission to use the computer after he moved 
out of the basement. As Myers explained, he "always let" Buck use the computer to "do 
his lawsuit stuff." R. 287:64-65. 
6. Myers went on vacation and left Buck in charge of his pets. R. 287:64. As 
usual, Buck had permission to use the computer. R. 287:64-65. 
7. When Myers returned, the computer was gone. R. 287:66. On the kitchen 
counter, he found a letter from Buck. R. 287:65; see State's Exhibit 3. In the letter, Buck 
ended the partnership and said he was taking "the computer because it had all his 
personal stuff on it and that he would pay [Myers] fair market value when he received 
appropriate funds." R. 287:65-66, 111. Buck did not provide a telephone number or say 
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what price he would pay for the computer or when he would pay. R. 287:66-67, 76-78, 
111,153. 
8. Several officers went to the house where Buck lived. R. 287:117-19. 
Responding to their questions, Buck said that "he had the computer5' and "asked if Mr. 
Myers had gotten the letter that he left for him at his house." R. 287:120. When Officer 
Boughn asked why Buck had taken the computer, Buck answered that "he needed it to 
continue on with his lawsuit." R. 287:122. Buck also said he had not bought the 
computer. R. 287:122-23. 
In this case, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Buck obtained 
or exercised control over the computer with the specific intent to commit theft, and not 
with "an honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over" the 
computer or "that [Myers], if present, would have consented." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
402(3)(b)-(c) (2003). 
As demonstrated by the marshaled evidence, the State had no direct evidence that 
Buck took the computer with the specific intent to commit theft rather than with an 
honest belief. R. 287. Instead, it presented circumstantial evidence and, during its 
closing argument, asked the jury to infer from the circumstantial evidence that Buck did 
not act with an honest belief. R. 287:172-78. Specifically, it argued that the jury should 
infer that Buck did not act with an honest belief based on the following circumstances: 
(1) Myers owned the computer before Buck arrived, (2) Buck did not help pay for the 
computer, (3) Buck did not have a written agreement giving him control over the 
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computer, (4) Buck took the computer while Myers was on vacation, (5) Buck did not 
provide a phone number, a price, or a pay-by date in his letter, and (6) Buck knew that 
Myers could not give him the computer because the license agreements for the software 
installed on the computer prohibited it. R. 287:172-78. 
This case was insufficient to warrant the conviction because it did not preclude 
'"every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.55' Layman, 953 P.2d at 786 (citations 
omitted). As noted in section I, there was no evidence to suggest that the software license 
agreements forbade Myers from giving the computer to Buck or that Buck had seen or 
read these license agreements. See supra at Part I. Thus, this claim is not properly part 
of the marshaled evidence and should not have been argued by the State. See id 
While there may have been circumstantial evidence to support the State's other 
inferences, this evidence did not disprove the reasonable hypothesis that Buck took the 
computer with an honest belief that he had an ownership interest in it or that Myers, if 
present, would not have objected to his taking it. See State v. O'Brien, 2003 UT App 
419, 2003 WL 22862190 at *1 (memorandum decision) (applying reasonable hypothesis 
test individually to intent and substantial step elements). To the contrary, the evidence 
strongly supported a reasonable hypothesis of honest belief. This is evidenced by the 
great difficulty the jury had reaching a verdict. R. 287:191-93. It deliberated for more 
than five hours and may not have reached a unanimous decision at all if the judge had not 
provided two verdict-urging instructions. R. 287:191-95; see supra at note 3. 
Unlike in Schad, Buck's story "jibe[s] with" the State's evidence just as well as, if 
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not better than, the story told by the State. Schad, 470 P.2d at 248. The evidence in this 
case, including the marshaled evidence, strongly suggests that this was not a theft, but a 
civil dispute among business partners and friends. R. 287. The uncontested evidence 
shows that Myers and Buck entered a partnership for which Myers willingly assumed full 
financial responsibility. R. 287:51-54, 72, 92, 133, 153. Beyond the partnership, Myers 
routinely exhibited a willingness to financially support Buck. R. 287:51-52. He allowed 
Buck to live in his house rent-free and he told Buck that he wanted to help Buck get back 
on his feet. R. 287:51-52. 
During the course of their personal and business relationship, Myers and Buck 
commingled their assets. R. 287:51-52, 105-06. They lived in the same home and they 
opened a joint bank account. R. 287:51-52, 105-06. The relationship was such that Buck 
felt secure depositing his personal paycheck into the account and felt free to withdraw 
money from the account without first getting Myers5 consent. R. 287:55, 75, 89. 
The asset in question here is the computer. The evidence is clear that Myers 
believed the computer belonged to him. R. 287:57-59, 65, 71, 73, 75, 90, 112. But this 
was not the question at trial. Rather, the question was whether Buck had an honest belief 
that he had an ownership interest in it or that Myers, if present, would not have objected 
to his taking it. R. 287:175, 181. Within the backdrop of Myers5 constant generosity and 
the pairs5 commingled assets, Buck's honest belief is a reasonable hypothesis. 
From Buck's point-of-view, it was reasonable for him to believe that the computer 
was built for him or, at least, for the partnership. The computer was in pieces when he 
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moved into Myers5 house. R. 287:150-51. Later, when Myers' son built the computer, 
Myers told Buck that he could use it for his lawsuit. R. 287:73, 75, 90, 150-51. Myers 
testified that he believed the lawsuit was irrelevant to the partnership, but Buck's belief 
that the lawsuit was part of the partnership agreement was reasonable because the lawsuit 
involved the patent for the very bridle that they intended to sell. R. 287:72, 88, 136-37, 
159. Thereafter, Buck used the computer routinely and he never saw anyone else use the 
computer. R. 287:62, 143, 154. Although Myers testified that it was a common family 
computer, he stipulated that the only data on the computer belonged to Buck. R. 287:62, 
143,154. 
Myers testified that all of his agreements with Buck were in writing and that he 
did not have a written agreement regarding the computer. R. 287:160-61. The State 
inferred from this that there was no agreement regarding the computer. But Myers' 
testimony was impeached when he admitted that their agreement that his wife would be 
part of the partnership was not in writing. R. 287:160-61. Additionally, Myers admitted 
that he and Buck had an agreement where Buck was allowed to use the computer, but he 
never produced a document recording this agreement or outlining its specific parameters. 
R. 287:73,75,90. 
Buck took the computer while Myers was on vacation, but he explained that he did 
so because he was dissolving the partnership and wanted to avoid a confrontation. R. 
287:144-45, 148, 153, 158. Instead, he left a signed letter informing Myers that he had 
taken the computer. R. 287:146. In the letter, Buck explained that he was dissolving the 
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partnership and that he would pay for the computer. R. 287:146. He also provided the 
address of where he intended to set up corporate headquarters. R. 287:158. He did not 
provide a telephone number, but that was unnecessary because Myers had the telephone 
number of the house where he was living as a caretaker. R. 287:69-70. 
In response to the letter, Myers did not speak to Buck and try to resolve the 
dispute. R. 287:70, 80. Instead, he called the police. R. 287:70, 80. Then, when the 
police arrived at Buck's house, Buck did not know why they were there. R. 287:126, 
144. He told the officers that he did not buy the computer, but he also explained that 
Myers had built the computer for him and that he had an ownership interest in it. R. 
287:122-23. He was upset when the officers seized the computer, but he was compliant 
and helped the officers carry the computer out. R. 287:124-25, 126, 130. At the officers' 
suggestion, he said that he would get an attorney to help him recover the information on 
the computer. R. 287:127. 
In sum, all of the evidence presented at trial, including the marshaled evidence, 
supports the reasonable hypothesis that this case did not involve a theft, but a civil 
dispute in which Buck honestly believed that he had an ownership interest in the 
computer or that Myers, if present, would not have objected to his taking it. R. 287:181. 
Thus, this Court should reverse because the circumstantial evidence wras insufficient to 
disprove the reasonable hypothesis that Buck, when he took the computer, honestly 
believed that he had an ownership interest in the computer or that Myers, if present, 
would not have objected to his taking it. 
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When the State produces insufficient evidence to warrant the conviction, this 
Court reverses without granting the State an opportunity for retrial. See Tibbs v. Florida, 
457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982) (noting "proper verdict" for "reversal based on insufficient 
evidence" is "acquittal"). Because there was insufficient evidence to warrant the verdict 
in this case, this Court should reverse without granting a new trial. If, however, this 
Court determines that the reasonable hypothesis test was not met, this Court should 
reverse and remand for a new trial because the circumstantial evidence produced to 
disprove Buck's honest belief was against the clear weigh of the evidence. 
Where "the State both has presented sufficient evidence to support conviction and 
has persuaded the jury to convict," but conviction was "against the clear weight of the 
evidence," some jurisdictions allow the appellate court to "sit[] as a 'thirteenth juror'" 
and "disagree^ with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony." Tibbs, 457 U.S. 
at 42-43 (noting "Florida Supreme Court ruled that Florida appellate courts no longer 
may reverse convictions on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence"); People v. Romero, 859 N.E.2d 902, 905-09 (N.Y. 2006) (outlining statutory 
history that gives appellate courts power to reweigh the evidence injury cases); State v. 
Thompkins, 678 N.E.2d 541, 546-47 (noting state constitution allows court of appeals to 
reweigh the evidence supporting the jury verdict where '"the jury clearly lost its way and 
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a 
new trial ordered'" (citation omitted)), superseded by state constitutional amendment on 
other grounds in State v. Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio 1997); Watson v. State, 204 
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S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting state constitution allows court of 
appeals to reweigh the evidence where the jury verdict "represents] a manifest injustice" 
because the evidence was "too weak to withstand scrutiny"); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 
404, 407-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (same).4 This, in effect, creates a "deadlocked jury," 
meaning that the appellate court may remand for a new trial, rather than simply affirming 
or acquitting. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42. 
In other words, the appellate court "'need not view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict; it may weigh the evidence and in so doing evaluate for itself the 
credibility of the witnesses.'" Id. at 38 n.l 1 (quoting United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 
1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980)). "'If the court concludes that, despite the abstract sufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily 
against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred, it may set 
aside the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the issues for determination by another 
jury.5" Id (quoting Lincoln, 630 F.2d at 1319). 
Appellate courts in these jurisdictions reserve "appellate intervention" for 
4
 Some states allow trial courts, but not appellate courts, to reweigh the evidence 
supporting a jury verdict. See, e.g., Porter v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr.3d 240, 247-48 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (noting state rule allows trial court to grant a new trial when verdict 
is contrary to weight of the evidence), review granted, 163 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2007); Toliver v. 
State, 953 So.2d 713, 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting rules of criminal procedure 
allow trial court to grant a new trial if the verdict is "against the weight of the evidence"); 
Karlson v. Harris, 97 P.3d 428, 435 (Idaho 2004) (noting rule of civil procedure allows 
trial judge to "grant a new trial" where "he concludes the verdict" is against "the clear 
weight of the evidence"); State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006) (holding 
rules a criminal procedure allow trial court to "grant a new trial where a verdict rendered 
by a jury is . . . '"contrary to the weight of the evidence"'" (citations omitted)). 
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"manifestly unjust verdicts." Romero, 859 N.E.2d at 904; see Lincoln, 630 F.2d at 1319. 
Then, in the rare cases where they decide to reweigh the evidence, these courts accord 
"[gjreat deference . . . to the fact-finder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the 
testimony and observe demeanor." Romero, 859 N.E.2d at 909 (citation omitted). In this 
way, these courts ensure that they do not "'substitute themselves for the jury.'" Id. at 909 
& n.2 (citation omitted) (noting New York's appellate courts function more as "second 
jury" than other courts because when they reweigh the evidence and reach a "different 
conclusion than that of the jury," the result "is an acquittal rather than a mistrial"). 
The Utah Constitution used to allow appellate courts to reweigh the evidence only 
in cases of equity. See Utah Const, art. VIII, sec. 9 (1971) ("In equity cases the appeal 
may be on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions 
of law alone."). In 1984, however, the Constitution was amended and the language 
allowing appellate courts to reweigh the evidence only in equity cases was removed. See 
Utah Const, art. VIII, sec. 9 (Supp. 1984). Since then, our supreme court has said that a 
bench verdict, whether from a case at law or a case of equity, is reviewed under "the 
clearly erroneous standard." RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60,p5, 96 P.3d 935. This 
"'clearly erroneous' standard" requires that if the trial court's verdict is "against the clear 
weight of the evidence," then it "will be set aside." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987); see InreZJD,, 2006 UT 54,1(32, 147 P.3d 401. 
Regarding jury verdicts, our supreme court has said, "Ordinarily, a reviewing 
court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in 
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the evidence in favor of the jury verdict." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 
1993) (citation omitted); see State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, ^23, 20 P.3d 265 ("On appeal 
we will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the jury's verdict unless the evidence is so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to an element of the crime."); Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 
939 P.2d 1213, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("In reviewing a jury verdict, we do not 
'reweigh the evidence or investigate witness credibility."' (citation omitted)). "In some 
unusual circumstances, however, a reviewing court may reassess witness credibility," 
such as when "evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could not 
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Workman, 852 P.2d at 984. 
Likewise, this Court should hold that in some unusual circumstances a reviewing 
court may reweigh the evidence in cases where the jury verdict was against the clear 
weight of the evidence. The Utah Constitution no longer expressly forbids appellate 
courts from reweighing the evidence injury cases. Compare Utah Const, art. VIII, sec. 9 
(1971), with Utah Const, art. VIII, sec. 9 (Supp. 1984). Utah appellate courts already 
reweigh the evidence in bench trial cases. See, e.g., Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. And rule 
24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, like rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, authorizes a new trial "in the interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 24(a); see Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 38 n. 12 (noting "some federal courts have 
interpreted Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes a new 
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trial 'if required in the interest of justice,' to permit the trial judge to set aside a 
conviction that is against the weight of the evidence" (citations omitted)). Plus, allowing 
appellate courts to reweigh the evidence will ensure fairness by "affording] the 
defendant a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment" in cases where the verdict 
was against the clear weight of the evidence. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 43. 
This case is appropriate for reweighing the evidence. As explained above, the 
State's case disproving Buck's honest belief relied entirely on circumstantial evidence. 
Even if it is true that the jury could have inferred the specific intent to steal from this 
evidence, the clear weight of the evidence suggests the opposite. Myers willingly 
assumed full financial responsibility in the partnership and routinely provided financial 
support for Buck's private affairs as well. R. 287:51-54, 72, 92, 133, 153. Plus, during 
their relationship, Myers and Buck commingled their assets, even opening a joint bank 
account. R. 287:105-06. The computer itself was built after Buck arrived and Myers told 
Buck that he could use it for his lawsuit. R. 287:150-51, 73, 75, 90, 143-44. Thereafter, 
Buck used the computer routinely and he never saw anyone else use the computer. R. 
287:62, 143, 154. Indeed, his was the only data on the computer. R. 287:62, 143, 154. 
Buck took the computer while Myers was on vacation, but he explained that he did 
so because he was dissolving the partnership and wanted to avoid a confrontation. R. 
287:145. He left a signed letter promising to pay for the computer and providing a new 
address. R. 287:65-66, 111; see State's Exhibit 3. He did not need to provide a 
telephone number because Myers already had that. R. 287:69-70. Later, when the police 
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arrived, Buck did not know why they were there. R. 287:119, 144. He told the officers 
that he did not buy the computer, but he also explained that Myers had built the computer 
for him and that he had an ownership interest in it. R. 287:122-23, 130. He was upset 
when the officers seized the computer, but he was compliant and helped the officers carry 
the computer out. R. 287:124-26, 130. 
The clear weight of this evidence supported acquittal. The jury itself found it very 
difficult to convict, ultimately deliberating for more than five hours and receiving two 
verdict-urging supplemental instructions before reaching a unanimous decision. See 
supra at note 3. Thus, if this Court holds that there was sufficient evidence under the 
reasonable hypothesis test to support Buck's conviction, then this Court should follow the 
example of other jurisdictions and hold that in rare cases, such as this one, where the 
verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, appellate courts may reverse the jury 
verdict and remand for a new trial.5 
5
 This issue was preserved by defense counsel's "motion for a directed verdict and to 
dismiss" because the State's evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Buck did not act with an honest belief. R. 287:162. Even if it was not, 
however, this Court should reach this issue, if necessary, through the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine. "'[Exceptional circumstances' is a concept that is used 
sparingly, properly reserved for truly exceptional situations, for cases . . . involving 'rare 
procedural anomalies.'" State v. Alfatlawl 2006 UT App 511, «|f44, 153 P.3d 804 
(citations omitted). This Court will "apply exceptional circumstances when 'our failure 
to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would . . . result[] in 
manifest injustice.'" Id. at ffi]13, 44. As explained above, this case represents the rare 
case where the evidence was against the clear weight of the evidence and manifest 
injustice will result if Buck is not afforded "a second opportunity to seek a favorable 
judgment." Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 43. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse without ordering a new trial because the evidence was 
insufficient to warrant the conviction. In the event that this Court does not reverse for 
insufficient evidence, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial because the 
State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct that prejudiced Buck's case and/or the guilty 
verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. 
SUBMITTED this ^ h day of January, 2008. 
v 
* - ^ ^A ^ - g fi/xOA. 
LORI J. SEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD ALLEN BUCK, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051400781 FS 
Judge: TERRY T CHRISTIANSEN 
Date: June 6, 2 0 07 
PRESENT 
Clerk: mindyg 
Prosecutor: BOWN, CHRISTOPHER G 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWARD, STEPHEN W 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 8, 1945 
Audio 
Tape Number: 7102 Tape Count: 83 5 
CHARGES 
1. THEFT - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/04/2007 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: 7102 COUNT: 835 
On record, Def counsel argument on Motion to arrest judgment 
COUNT: 84 3 
States argument on Motion to arrest judgment 
COUNT: 844 
Court finds there was not error and denies Defts motion to arrest 
judgment. Deft agrees to be sentenced today. 
Page 1 
Case No: 051400781 
Date: Jun 06, 2 00 7 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a CLass A Misdemeanor, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time 
suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2 000.00 
Surcharge: $243.24 
Due: $500.00 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $2000.00 
Total Surcharge: $243.24 
Total Principal Due: $500.00 
Plus Interest 
The fine is to be paid in full by 04/06/2008. 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 75 hour(s) of community service. 
Community service is to be completed by April 6, 2008. 
Attorney Fees Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 12 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Good behavior court probation. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 500.00 which includes the surcharge 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine on or before April 6, 2008. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
Paqe 2 
Case No: 051400781 
Date: Jun 06, 2007 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No other violations. 
Notify the court of any address change. 
Timely payments of all fines, attorney fees and restitution. 
Deft to complete a Cognitive Restructuring class through Changes by 
8-16-07 
Complete 75 hours of community service hours in lieu of jail at 10 
hours per month 
Deft may complete additional community service hours in lieu of the 
fine at $7.00 per hour 
Deft to pay fine and fees at $100.00 per month beginning 7-15-07 
Deft to have no contact with Mr. Myers and his family other then 
Court appearances. 




Page 3 (last) 
TabB 
Utah Const, art. VIII, sec . 9 (1971) 
Sec. 9. [Appeals from district court—From justices' courts.] 
From all final judgments of the district courts, there shall be a right 
of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon the record 
made in the court below and under such regulations as may be provided 
by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and 
fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone. Ap-
peals shall also lie from the final orders and decrees of the Court in the 
administration of decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall 
be provided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of 
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the District Courts on 
both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions 
as shall be provided by law; and the decision of the District Courts on 
such appeals shall be final, except in cases involving the validity or con-
stitutionality of a statute. 
Utah Const, art. VIII (Supp 1984) 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
Section 
1. [Judicial powers—Courts.] 
2. [Supreme court—Chief justice—Declaring law unconstitutional—Justice unable to partic-
ipate.] 
3. [Jurisdiction of supreme court.] 
4. [Rule-making power of supreme court—Judges pro tempore—Regulation of practice of 
law.] 
5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts—Right of appeal.] 
6. [Number of judges of district court and other courts—Divisions.] 
7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.] 
8. [Vacancies—Nominating commissions—Senate approval.] 
9. [Judicial retention elections.] 
10. [Restrictions on justices and judges.] 
11. [Judges of courts not of record.] 
12. [Judicial Council—Chief justice as administrative officer.] 
13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.] 
14. [Compensation of justices and judges.] 
15. [Mandatory retirement.] 
16. [Public prosecutors.] 
Compiler's Notes. 
The repeal and reenactment of Article VIII was proposed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, 
Laws 1984 (2d S.S.), and approved at the general election on November 6, 1984 to become 
effective July 1, 1985. 
Section 4 of Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, Laws 1984 (2d S.S.), provides: "This amendment 
shall not shorten the term of office nor abolish the office of any justice of the supreme court, any 
judge of the district court, or judge of any other court who is holding office on the effective date 
of this amendment. Justices and judges holding office on the effective date of this amendment 
shall hold their respective offices for the terms for which they were elected or appointed and at 
the completion of their current terms shall be considered incumbent officeholders. Existing stat-
utes and rules on the effective date of this amendment, not inconsistent with it, shall continue in 
force and effect until repealed or changed by statute." 
U C ^ L U J J L I i . L^ U U l t l d l p U W d l b ^UUILJS.J 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, in a trial court of 
general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as the legisla-
ture by statute may establish. The supreme court, the district court, and such other 
courts designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts not of record shall also 
be established by statute. 
Law Reviews. 
An Intermediate Appellate Court—Does 
Utah Need One?, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 107. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS 
Employees of justice of peace. 
Employment of wives and daughters-in-law 
of justices of the peace as clerks in their rela-
tives' justice courts violated former Article 
VIII, sec. 15, of the Utah Constitution. Baum-
gaertel v. Salt Lake County (1977) 560 P 2d 
325. 
One form of civil action. 
Pursuant to former Article VIII, sec. 19, of 
the Utah Constitution, equitable principles 
may be applied in an action at law. Marlowe 
Investment Corp. v. Radmall (1971) 26 U 2d 
124, 485 P 2d 1402; Williamson v. Wanlass 
(1976) 545 P 2d 1145. 
Sec. 2. [Supreme court—Chief just ice—Declaring law u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l -
Justice unable to participate.] 
The supreme court shall be the highest court and shall consist of at least five jus-
tices. The number of justices may be changed by statute, but no change shall have the 
effect of removing a justice from office. A chief justice shall be selected from among 
the justices of the supreme court as provided by statute. The chief justice may resign 
as chief justice without resigning from the supreme court. The supreme court by rule 
may sit and render final judgment either en banc or in divisions. The court shall not 
declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or the Constitution of the 
United States, except on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the supreme 
court. If a justice of the supreme court is disqualified or otherwise unable to partici-
pate in a cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief justice is 
disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall call an active judge 
from an appellate court or the district court to participate in the cause. 
Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of supreme court.] 
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The 
supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised 
as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the 
exercise of the supreme court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of any 
cause. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS 
Appellate jurisdiction. 
Appellate jurisdiction connotes review of the 
action of an inferior court federal courts are 
not inferior courts to the Utah supreme court 
and supreme court's answer to certified ques-
tions in a case that originated in or is to be 
adjudicated in a federal court is not an exercise 
of appellate jurisdiction within the meaning of 
this section. Holden v. N L Industries, Inc. 
(1981) 629 P 2d 428. 
Certified questions. 
Supreme court of Utah does not have juris-
diction to answer questions of state law cer-
tified to it by the federal courts in cases that 
are to be adjudicated or originate in the fed-
eral courts; therefore, supreme court's cer-
tification rule was withdrawn. Holden v. N L 
Industries, Inc. (1981) 629 P 2d 428. 
Certiorari. 
Where, due to untimeliness, a criminal con-
viction was no longer subject to review by the 
statutory remedy of appeal, and a habeas cor-
pus proceeding, which was properly before the 
supreme court on appeal, held that defendant 
had been deprived of his constitutional right to 
an appeal, and the alleged error could not have 
been corrected on appeal and the defendant 
had taken the initiative to seek an appeal be-
fore the time for appeal had passed, supreme 
court exercised its discretion to issue the 
common law writ of certiorari to allow defen-
dant a direct review in the supreme court of 
the alleged errors in his trial. Boggess v. 
Morris (1981) 635 P 2d 39. 
Habeas corpus. 
Matters which have been or could have been 
raised on appeal cannot be brought before the 
court by habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is a 
civil matter and the findings of the trial court 
are presumed to be proper unless there is no 
substantial evidence to sustain them. Schacl v. 
Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 345, 496 P 2d 263; Wil-
son v. Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 368, 496 P 2d 711; 
Leggroan v. Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 403, 497 P 
2d 17; Zumbrunnen v. Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 
428, 497 P 2d 34. 
Kegulation of practice of law.J 
The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The legislature may 
amend the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the supreme court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the legislature. Except as otherwise 
provided by this constitution, the supreme court by rule may authorize retired justices 
and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore 
shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in 
Utah. The supreme court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission 
to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS 
Judge pro tempore. 
Appointment of a judge pro tempore to hear 
and decide a divorce action does not violate the 
provisions of 30-3-4, since a properly appointed 
pro tempore judge becomes the equal in every 
respect to the regular judge. Harward v. 
Harwarcl (1974) 526 P 2d 1183. 
Regulation of practice of law. 
Inherent in the judicial power conferred on 
the Supreme Court by former Article VIII, 
Appeal to Supreme Court by the state in 
criminal cases. 
This section does not grant the state a gen-
eral right of appeal in criminal cases. State v. 
Kelbach (1977) 569 P 2d 1100. 
Appeal to Supreme Court where case 
originated in circuit court. 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain 
appeals from district court decisions where the 
case originated in a circuit court and involves a 
constitutional issue; Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion is not limited, as is its jurisdiction over 
appeals from a district court decision where 
the case originated in a justice court, to cases 
involving the constitutionality or validity of a 
statute. State v. Taylor (1983) 664 P 2d 439. 
Appeal to Supreme Court where case 
originated in justice or city court. 
In absence of transcript of record which 
might show that constitutionality of ordinance 
was raised in district court, Supreme Court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider any phase of 
case tried in district court on appeal from city 
court for violation of ordinance requiring re-
moval of weeds, refuse, and other deleterious 
objects. State v. Sheldon (1976) 545 P 2d 513. 
Assertion that criminal statute is uncon-
stitutionally applied, thereby depriving appel-
lant of due process, is not a "case involving the 
validity or constitutionality of a statute" within 
the meaning of this section, and Supreme 
Court is without jurisdiction to review convic-
tion after trial de novo entered by district 
court following conviction in justice court. 
Vernal City v. Critton (1977) 565 P 2d 408. 
Where constitutionality of a statute is an 
issue at the city court or justice of the peace 
level, such an issue is an exception under this 
section to an otherwise prohibition of appeal 
from such lower courts to the supreme court. 
Circuit judge appointed by state court ad-
ministrator to serve temporarily as a district 
judge pursuant to 78-3-24 and 78-4-15 is not a 
judge pro tempore and is not subject to the 
legal restrictions pertaining to that status. Ca-
hoon v. Cahoon (1982) 641 P 2d 140. 
sec. 1, of the Utah Constitution is the power to 
regulate the practice of law. In re Utah State 
Bar Petition (1982) 647 P 2d 991. 
district court's application of motor vehicle 
speeding violation statute to defendant where 
defendant had received a trial de novo in the 
district court on appeal of conviction in justice 
court; however, supreme court did have juris-
diction to determine whether the statute in-
volved was unconstitutionally vague. State v. 
Munger (1982) 642 P 2d 721. 
In providing for appeals from the district 
court of cases that originate in justice court, 
the more narrowly drawn restrictions of this 
section, which permit appeals in cases "involv-
ing the validity or constitutionality of a stat-
ute," are controlling over the broader language 
of 78-3-5, which permits such appeals in cases 
"involving a constitutional issue." State v. 
Munger (1982) 642 P 2d 721. 
Defendant had no right to appeal his convic-
tion of driving under the influence to the Su-
preme Court where he was first tried and 
convicted by a jury in the justice of the peace 
court, appealed to the district court where a 
trial de novo was conducted and evidence was 
taken, and defendant did not challenge the va-
lidity or constitutionality of a statute. State v. 
Van Gervan (1983) 657 P 2d 1377. 
Defendant's right to appeal. 
Criminal defendant's decision to avail him-
self of his constitutional right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court from a final judgment in an 
original jurisdiction case from the district 
court may not be impaired by making it condi-
tional upon the threat of a harsher sentence in 
the event that exercise of that right results in 
a reversal. Chess v. Smith (1980) 617 P 2d 341. 
Second sentence, imposed after conviction 
on retrial following defendant's successful ap-
peal, which increased the time of commitment 
to the penitentiary over the time imposed by 
the original sentence, was more severe than 
4-1 ; 1 4. J 4.T ^ ~ . _ .' i : - i 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other cour ts—Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by 
this constituion or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district 
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all 
other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for 
matters filed originally with the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of 
right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over 
the cause. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS 
fendant's constitutional right to appeal. State 
v. Sorensen (1981) 639 P 2d 179. 
At a trial de novo in the district court on 
appeal from a criminal conviction in a justice 
court, the defendant could not be given a more 
severe sentence than imposed by the justice 
court. Wisden v. District Court of Sevier 
County (1984) 694 P 2d 605. 
Divorce decree. 
Supreme Court has authority to either 
exercise its own prerogative in making a mod-
ification of an inequitable property settlement 
in a divorce decree or remand for entry of a 
modified decree by the trial court. Read v. 
Read (1979) 594 P 2d 871. 
Modification of divorce decrees is a matter of 
equity and it is the duty and prerogative of the 
Supreme Court to review both the facts and 
the law; action of the trial court will not be dis-
turbed unless the evidence clearly preponder-
ates to the contrary or there has been an abuse 
of discretion or misapplication of law. Christ-
ensen v. Christensen (1981) 628 P 2d 1297. 
Equity as distinguished from law case. 
Where divorced husband sought modification 
of divorce decree because he had received a 
reduction in salary and he felt he no longer had 
a legal obligation to support 24-year-old son 
and 20-year-old daughter who were living with 
divorced wife, the proceeding was in equity 
and the Supreme Court could review the evi-
dence, make its own findings and substitute its 
judgment for that of trial court when the ends 
of justice so required; however, the actions of 
the trial court were indulged with a presump-
tion of validity and correctness, so that reduc-
tion of payments from $250 per month to $200 
per month was discretionary as the law did not 
require a mother to turn her adult children 
out. Harding v. Harding (1971) 26 U 2d 277, 
488 P 2d 308. 
Failure to raise issue of statute's constitu-
tionality below. 
Where appellant does not contend in the 
court below that the statute under which he 
was convicted is invalid, the decision of the 
district court in cases appealed to it from jus-
tice court are not subject to further review. 
Vernal City v, Critton (1977) 565 P 2d 408. 
Final judgment. 
Where court granted one defendant's motion 
to dismiss with prejudice and entered default 
judgment in favor of that defendant on his 
counterclaim against plaintiff, but action 
against other defendants and one defendant's 
counterclaim remained alive, court's order was 
not a final order and appeal from it would be 
dismissed. Kennedy v. New Era Industries, 
Inc. (1979) 600 P 2d 534. 
Habeas corpus. 
Where district court certified petition for 
writ of habeas corpus to juvenile court for de-
termination of custody rights, juvenile court 
was without jurisdiction to deny the writ, but 
should have made recommendations and re-
ferred the matter back to the district court for 
final order. State in interest of Hales (1975) 
538 P 2d 1034. 
Juvenile court supervision. 
The district courts can issue writs of habeas 
corpus to determine legality of a child's deten-
tion without acting as an appellate court in re-
versing or amending an order made by the 
juvenile court. R. v. Whitmer in and for Salt 
Lake County (1973) 30 U 2d 206, 515 P 2d 617. 
Review in cases at law. 
In appeal of cases at law, Supreme Court's 
review is limited to questions of law, and a 
jury verdict on a factual question which is sup-
ported by any competent evidence will not be 
disturbed Christiansen v. Utah Transit 
Authority (1982) 649 P 2d 42. 
Review of evidence—Equity cases. 
In equity cases the Supreme Court reviews 
the evidence, keeping in mind the trial court's 
proximity to the parties and witnesses, and the 
Supreme Court will upset the findings of the trial 
court only if the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the lower court's findings. Del Porto v. 
Nicolo (1972) 27 U 2d 286, 495 P 2d 811. 
Supreme Court will not interfere with the 
lower court's findings of fact unless the evi-
dence so clearly preponderates against the 
findings as to amount to a manifest injustice. 
Hatch v. Bastian (1977) 567 P 2d 1100. 
In reviewing trial court's findings in equity 
cases, supreme court will disturb the trial court's 
findings and judgment only if it appears the evi-
dence clearly preponderates against the findings, 
or that the trial court has misapplied the law, or 
abused its discretion, so that an injustice has re-
sulted. Izatt v. Izatt (1981) 627 P 2d 49. 
In reviewing trial court's findings of fact in 
equity cases, the Supreme Court will give due 
deference to the trial court's decision and re-
verse only when the evidence clearly prepon-
derates against the trial court's findings. Jen-
sen v. Brown (1981) 639 P2d 150. 
Small claims. 
District court has concurrent jurisdiction 
with small claims court over civil claims under 
$40u. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Legal & 
Professional Publications, Inc. v. Gordon 
(1981) 635 P 2d 28. 
Sec. 6. [Number of judges of district court and other courts—Divisions.] 
The number of judges of the district court and of other courts of record established 
by the legislature shall be provided by statute. No change in the number of judges 
shall have the effect of removing a judge from office during a judge's term of office. 
Geographic divisions for all courts of record except the supreme court may be pro-
vided by statute. No change in divisions shall have the effect of removing a judge from 
office during a judge's term of office. 
Cross-References. 
Judicial districts, 78-3-2. 
Sec. 7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.] 
Supreme court justices shall be at least 30 years old, United States citizens, Utah 
residents for five years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
Judges of other courts of record shall be at least 25 years old, United States citizens, 
Utah residents for three years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law in 
Utah. If geographic divisions are provided for any court, judges of that court shall 
reside in the geographic division for which they are selected. 
Sec. 8. [Vacancies—Nominating commissions—Senate approval.] 
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the governor shall fill the vacancy by 
appointment from a list of at least three nominees certified to the governor by the 
judicial nominating commission having authority over the vacancy. The governor shall 
fill the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of nominees. If the governor fails 
to fill the vacancy within the time prescribed, the chief justice of the supreme court 
shall within 20 days make the appointment from the list of nominees. The legislature 
by statute shall provide for the nominating commissions' composition and procedures. 
No member of the legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the legislature 
appoint members to, any judicial nominating commission. The senate shall consider 
and render a decision on each judicial appointment within 30 days of the date of ap-
pointment. If necessary, the senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session for 
the purpose of considering judicial appointments. The appointment shall be effective 
upon approval of a majority of all members of the senate. If the senate fails to approve 
the appointment, the office shall be considered vacant and a new nominating process 
shall commence. Selection of judges shall be based solely upon consideration of fitness 
for office without regard to any partisan political considerations. 
Sec, 9. [Judicial retention elections.] 
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject to an unopposed retention elec-
tion at the first general election held more than three years after appointment. Follow-
ing initial voter approval, each supreme court justice every tenth year, and each judge 
of other courts of record every sixth year, shall be subject to an unopposed retention 
election at the corresponding general election. Judicial retention elections shall be held 
on a nonpartisan ballot in a manner provided by statute. If geographic divisions are 
provided for any court of record, the judges of those courts shall stand for retention 
election only in the geographic division to which they are selected. 
Sec. 10. [Restrictions on justices and judges.] 
Supreme court justices, district court judges, and judges of all other courts of rec-
ord while holding office may not practice law, hold any elective nonjudicial public 
office, or hold office in a political party. 
Sec. 11. [Judges of courts not of record.] 
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a manner, for a term, and with 
qualifications provided by statute. However, no qualification may be imposed which 
requires judges of courts not of record to be admitted to practice law. The number of 
judges of courts not of record shall be provided by statute. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS 
Due process. due process; any change in the system ought to 
Supreme Court would not declare that in- Proceed from the sovereign, i.e., the people, 
sofar as it allowed lay judges to preside at and n o t f rom t h e c o u r t s a s a r e s u l t of judicial 
trials on charges where conviction could result decision. Shehmdme v. Jones (1976), 550 P 2d 
in imprisonment, the justice of the peace sys-
tern was unconstitutional because violative of 
Sec. 12. [Judicial Council—Chief justice as administrative officer.] 
A Judicial Council is established, which shall adopt rules for the administration of 
the courts of the state. The Judicial Council shall consist of the chief justice of the 
supreme court, as presiding officer, and such other justices, judges, and other persons 
as provided by statute. There shall be at least one representative on the Judicial 
Council from each court established by the constitution or by statute. The chief justice 
of the supreme court shall be the chief administrative officer for the courts and shall 
implement the rules adopted by the Judicial Council. 
Sec. 13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.] 
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established which shall investigate and conduct 
confidential hearings regarding complaints against any justice or judge. Following its 
investigations and hearings, the Judicial Conduct Commission may order the repri-
mand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary retirement of any justice or judge 
for the following: 
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in office; 
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law; 
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties; 
(4) disability that seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties; or 
(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office 
into disrepute. 
Prior to the implementation of any commission order, the supreme court shall re-
view the commission's proceedings as to both law and fact. The court may also permit 
the introduction of additional evidence. After its review, the supreme court shall, as it 
finds just and proper, issue its order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the com-
mission's order. The legislature by statute shall provide for the composition and pro-
cedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission. 
Sec. 14. [Compensation of justices and judges.] 
The legislature shall provide for the compensation of all justices and judges. The 
salaries of justices and judges shall not be diminished during their terms of office. 
Sec. 15. [Mandatory retirement.] 
The legislature may provide standards for the mandatory retirement of justices and 
judges from office. 
Sec. 16. [Public prosecutors.] 
The legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors who shall have pri-
mary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the 
State of Utah and shall perform such other duties as may be provided by statute. 
Public prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided by statute, and shall be 
admitted to practice law in Utah. If a public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute, 
the supreme court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro tempore. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502 (2003) 
76-1-502, Negating defense by allegation or proof— When 
not required. 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of evidence 
presented at trial, either by the prosecution or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has 
presented evidence of such affirmative defense. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-502, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-502. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (2003) 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory expla-
nation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the 
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for 
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-402, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 16. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003) 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Shoplifting Act, § 78-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404. 11-14 et seq 
UtahR. Crim.P.24 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after entry 
of the sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before 
expiration of the time for filing a motion for new trial. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2005; April 1, 2007.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2005 amend- riod" in Subdivision (c). 
ment substituted "not later than 10 days" for The 2007 amendment substituted ''entry of 
"within 10 days" and the phrase beginning the sentence" for "imposition of sentence" in 
"before expiration" for "during the ten-day pe- Subdivision (c). 
Utah R. Prof Conduct 3.4 
Rule 3.4. Fairness to Opposing Par ty and Counsel. 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully 
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential 
evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any 
such act; 
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an 
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law; 
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; 
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make 
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by 
an opposing party; 
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe 
is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert 
personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or 
state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a 
witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused; 
or 
(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving 
relevant information to another party unless: 
(f)(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and 
(f)(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be 
adversely affected by refraining from giving such information. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2005.) 
Comment. — [1] The procedure of the adver-
sary system contemplates that the evidence in 
a case is to be marshalled competitively by the 
contending parties. Fair competition in the 
adversary system is secured by prohibitions 
against destruction or concealment of evidence, 
improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive 
tactics in discovery procedure and the like. 
[21 Documents and other items of evidence 
are often essential to establish a claim or de-
fense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the 
right of an opposing party, including the gov-
ernment, to obtain evidence through discovery 
or subpoena is an important procedural right. 
The exercise of that right can be frustrated if 
relevant material is altered, concealed or de-
stroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions 
makes it an offense to destroy material for the 
purpose of impairing its availability in a pend-
ing proceeding or one whose commencement 
can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also 
Cited in State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 
1991). 
generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) 
applies to evidentiary material generally, in 
whatever form it may exist and on whatever 
medium it may be found. Applicable law may 
permit a lawyer to take temporary possession 
of physical evidence of client crimes for the 
purpose of conducting a limited examination 
that will not alter or destroy material charac-
teristics of the evidence. In such a case, appli-
cable law may require the lawyer to turn the 
evidence over to the police or other prosecuting 
authority, depending on the circumstances. 
[31 With regard to paragraph (b), it is not 
improper to pay a witness's expenses or to 
compensate an expert witness on terms permit-
ted by law. 
[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise 
employees of a client to refrain from giving 
information to another party, for the employees 
may identify their interests with those of the 
client. See also Rule 4.2. 
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1 THE COURT: Don't let the jury come in for a 
2 minute. We're back on the record in the matter of State of 
3 Utah vs. Edward Allen Buck, the jury is not present, both 
4 counsel, or all counsel and defendant are present. You have 
5 a motion; is that correct? 
6 MR. HOWARD: We do Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
8 MR. HOWARD: I'd make a motion for directed verdict 
9 and to dismiss. The grounds for that being that the statute 
10 provides complete (inaudible) actor has an honest belief that 
11 he had a claim of right to the property involved before and 
12 after (inaudible) honestly believed he has a right to obtain 
13 or exercise control over the property or (inaudible) exercise 
14 control of the property honestly believing that the owner if 
15 present would have consented. There's been evidence 
16 presented of that honest belief. Once that evidence is 
17 presented, burden shifts to the State to prove beyond a 
18 reasonable doubt that there was no honest dealing. I think 
19 the evidence presented supports that, both in his actions, 
20 conduct and the letter that he left. I believe that the 
21 State's evidence is not sufficient to beyond a reasonable 
22 doubt that he did not have that honest belief. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Bown? 
24 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, a direct verdict (inaudible) 
25 I all the evidence is taken in the light most favorable to the 
162 
1 state. We've put on a prima facie case of that and I would 
2 submit it on that, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: It seems to me it's a fact issue as to 
4 whether or not there was the honest belief. I'm going to ask 
5 for the jury to decide. I'm going to deny your motion. 
6 All right, bring the jury in. 
7 (Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom) 
8 THE COURT: Be seated. The record will reflect the 
9 jury is now back in the courtroom. We're going to finish 
10 reading the jury instructions. We'll start on page 7 with 
11 jury instruction No. 18. 
12 The instructions on the law that applies to this 
13 case — 
14 COURT CLERK: We're one short. (inaudible). 
15 THE COURT: Now we're ready. The clerk has 
16 attached to your copy of these instructions some additional 
17 pages which contain instructions of the particular laws or 
18 rule that apply in this case. These additional instructions 
19 begin with Instruction No. 27. We'll read those after 
20 concluding our review of the following instructions which 
21 relate essentially to the procedure that you should follow. 
22 Instruction No. 19. What to take with you into the 
23 jury room. You may take the following things with you when 
24 you go into the jury room to discuss this case. (A) All 
25 exhibits admitted in evidence;(b) your notes if any; (c) your 
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1 this isn't going to work out (inaudible) but we're here and 
2 you six people get to decide (inaudible). 
3 The State's got to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
4 that Allen Buck did not have that (inaudible) wrote the 
5 letter and said this is who I am and when the police came he 
6 cooperated, he took it out to their car. I think the 
7 evidence supports the (inaudible) and I'd ask you to 
8 (inaudible). 
9 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Howard. 
10 Mr. Bown? 
11 MR. BOWN: First of all I just want to say I don't 
12 criticize defense counsel. I just criticize (inaudible). 
13 Let's get down to the heart of the matter. What he's 
14 trying to say (inaudible) Mr. Buck had - the defendant left a 
15 note saying, heh, I'm taking this (inaudible) fair market 
16 value and I'll find out what that is and I don't know the 
17 date, so who knows when I'll pay you back. We admit that. 
18 You don't even get to the partnership. He says there -
19 there is a partnership and I don't think we're denying that 
20 there's not a partnership. The problem is if you look at the 
21 agreement it talks about assets, what are assets of the 
22 partnership and from our prospective (inaudible) cross 
23 J examination, what were the assets of the business of Superior 
24 Cavalry? Nothing. Maybe a website. So there's no assets. 
25 I So the partnership can't be used as a basis to get at this 
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1 (inaudible). They have no assets, so no matter was interest 
2 he had, the bridle, the computer wasn't an asset. So he has 
3 to (inaudible) and then he has to say, well, Myers gave it to 
4 me. And the reason Myers gave it to him is the business 
5 (inaudible) the computer existed, the computer existed prior 
6 to Mr. Buck. So it wasn't made for him. Other family 
7 members used it, there was a virus problem before so the 
8 family used it for a month and a half beforehand (inaudible). 
9 It doesn't matter about use. Who cares if you use a 
10 computer? Go to the library, check out a computer, leave some 
11 stuff on it for a while, don't mean to take it, leave an IOU, 
12 I'm not guilty (inaudible) permanently deprive somebody, and 
13 let them know who I was, let them know where I was. I didn't 
14 discuss price, I didn't discussed when I'd pay it off but my 
15 stuff was on it. Use doesn't matter so just because he used 
16 it doesn't equal ownership. 
17 So just look at (inaudible) he took the computer 
18 when Myers was not home. Why did he do that? At all the 
19 other times, a year and half to (inaudible) that computer 
20 that he was supposedly was (inaudible) his own. He doesn't 
21 (inaudible) living arrangement. He doesn't come take it when 
22 Mr. Myers is there (inaudible), he takes it when he's gone. 
23 He left a letter with an address in Las Vegas, no telephone 
24 number. He didn't mention a price. He didn't mention a date 
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. basis to 
Myers made it for 
me, even get down to the fact that Myers (inaudible) showed 
up and the defendant's own statements to Deputy Boughn that 
it wasn't his. 
You look at Sargent Brenaman's testimony under the 
stipulation that's evidence No. 2, he stated he had an 
interest in the computer. Now there's a jury instruction 
that tells you just because you have an interest in the 
property, (inaudible) Mr. Buck's statements (inaudible). He 
had no interest in the property. Mr. Myers owned that 
property. Mr. Buck did not have the privilege or ability to 
deprive Mr. Myers of that, that interest, no matter what. 
(Inaudible). So he takes away that interest in the property, 
he permanently deprived him of that. 
Also, he indicated (inaudible) for the computer. 
187 
1 There was nothing of Mr. Buck's, assets or anything to do 
2 with (inaudible). He had nothing on it. 
3 I go back to Mr. Howard's example of (inaudible) 
4 well, the difference between the (inaudible) analogy and this 
5 case is that Mr. Howard (inaudible) and he brought it back 
6 and he paid him. He gave him a better mallet. Now, of 
7 course, the neighbor could have said, I'd like my old mallet 
8 back and he would have been (inaudible) but he paid him for 
9 it, gave him exchange, agreed upon, no problem. (Inaudible) 
10 unilateral action on Mr. Buck that day when he went in Mr. 
11 Myers' house, took this computer to which he had no interest 
12 in. (Inaudible) but if you look at the facts under the 
13 formal basis for why did you have that honest belief? There 
14 is nothing under that. There is nothing to support that and 
15 that's all that (inaudible) against that and that's where we 
16 come down to in this case. Just because he stands up there 
17 and say I thought it was mine, that's sufficient (inaudible) 
18 proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We could take all the other 
19 facts. The fact that Mr. Myers was up here, subjected 
20 himself to cross-examination, there's a partnership agreement 
21 that doesn't mention a computer. There is a stipulation on 
22 the amount and what was in it which is part of why we agreed 
23 to that. We know what was in it. All the facts come back is 
24 that Mr. Buck permanently deprived him thereof because 
25 J (inaudible) and you may say this is a silly case in the long 
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1 run. No case is silly because there are reasonable disputes 
2 about things. 
3 When you go back, look at the facts, look at what 
4 supports the State's case, all the evidence showed Mr. Buck 
5 stole the computer versus he had an (inaudible) a lot to 
6 support an honest belief. 
7 The last thing I wanted to talk about was let's 
8 take (inaudible) the logical conclusion of what they are 
9 arguing today. If you had an honest belief and you go take 
10 something from somebody, say you let your neighbor borrow 
11 your lawnmower and your neighbor puts some gas in it and he 
12 uses it all the time and you, being the nice person, lets him 
13 use that lawnmower. At any point based on what defense 
14 counsel was arguing today, that neighbor can come over and he 
15 said he had gas in that computer - computer - gas in that 
16 lawnmower and he just leaves a note saying (inaudible) and 
17 you have to go find where your neighbor went or even taking 
18 that to a logical conclusion if somebody come and takes 
19 something out of your house or something out of your backyard 
20 and leaves a note with their name on it and an address, 
21 defense counsel wants you to have to go out and find that 
22 person and negotiate with them to get it back, you're not 
23 entitled to call the police. (inaudible). We live in a 
24 society of rules and laws and it's your property. The only 
25 way it leaves your possession is by your agreement and I ask 
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1 you, where was that agreement? There was no agreement. And 
2 for that reason I ask you to convict Mr. Buck (inaudible). 
3 Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bown. 
5 Counsel, I want you to approach. I want you to 
6 review the verdict form before I give it to the jury. 
7 We have just the four exhibits, Defense 1. 
8 All right, members of the jury, that does conclude 
9 this case. I'm going to have my bailiff sworn in as a 
10 custodian at this point. 
11 (Whereupon the bailiff was sworn). 
12 THE COURT: Here is the verdict form, the jury 
13 instructions and the exhibits. Court is in recess until the 
14 jury makes their decision. 
15 (Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
16 THE COURT: Thank you counsel, stay close or leave 
17 cell phone numbers with clerk. 
18 (Recess for deliberation at 3:40:53) 
19 (Whereupon the jury enters the courtroom at 6:47:24) 
20 THE COURT: Be seated. What was the last jury 
21 instruction number? 
22 MR. BOWN: Thirty-seven. 
23 THE COURT: The last one was 37? 
24 MR. BOWN: Yes - 35. 
25 THE COURT: So this would be 36. 
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LISTEN TO SPIRIT 
NOT MAN 
August 23, 2005 
Mr. Allen Myers 
2346 E. Charros Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Allen, 
It is with a heavy heart and a clear conscious that I leave you behind me and my Spirit Bridle. I 
highly appreciate the opportunity of filing the law suit against Cook; however, everything else 
heavily out weighs that bit of usefulness in my life. 
Luke Chapter 10 verse 10 & 11 say this, 10 "But whatever city you enter and they do not receive you, 
go out into its streets and say", 11 "Even the dust of your city which clings to our feet, we wipe off 
against you, yet be sure of this that the kingdom of God has come near." 
The kingdom of Heaven is around you but you do not have eyes to see or ears to hear and your mouth 
stays not silent in humility. 
This is the hardest letter I have ever had to write, but your actions and lack of actions have forced me 
to act for my health and welfare. You made a commitment to supposedly be a business partner, 
however, your commitment has been not to sacrifice and really commit to the business but rather it 
has been to do as little as possible and expect the most in return. In trying to do business with others, 
you want everything cut rate and the heck with the fact that someone else needs to earn a living from 
what they provide and this turns people against you and what you have to offer. 
I have loved as a brother and you have treated me as a cash cow, providing me with as little as 
possible to exist while expecting a gigantic return. You have lost me and a great future that will 
materialize shortly. The reason is simple; you lack the integrity and humility to be truly spiritual. 
You use your free will nature to be an emotional and physical bully to others and if anything is said 
against you, you either try and throw it back on those speaking or blame the "Adversary". The only 
place to rest the blame is with you.. .not with outside sources, it is your free will. Your attitude you 
present to everyone is simply that you can do everything better than everyone else and you have done 
it all...no matter what someone says you can out do them. You belittle people with your 
condescending attitude. You are a control freak a dominating, manipulating, power hungry 
individual. 
Supreme Performance Through Supreme Freedom 
Rev Edward Allan Buck, "Spirit Horse" 
6133 Rifle Crest Ave 
Las Vegas, NV 89156 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
I EXHIBIT NO. y ^ 3 
CASE NO. (3Si<4 ocrrgi 
DATEREC'D t i / i _ A " ~ 7 
IN EVIDENCE H T Hi U I 
[CLERK ^ 
August 23, 2005 
Page 2 
To date you have done as little as possible to advance Spirit Bridle. To date you have not changed 
the web site as I requested July 23, 2005. Instead you demand of me that I use the email account you 
set up instead of what I choose. Once again you bully. The web site is not in our names it is in your 
name and the bank account has your wife's name on it, to wit I did not give you permission to do 
that. The straw that stuck me in the foot and makes me do what Christ said to do, is the fact that you 
chose to ignore the opportunity of a lifetime for me and Spirit Bridle and thus the business. You 
knew I requested a roundtrip airfare to Kentucky and your wife knew the reason and yet you do not 
have the integrity to call me or see me before you take off on a vacation in Oregon. 
I lost my stallion, which was the poster horse for Spirit Bridle {he went to the killers}; because you 
choose not to help and yet I saw you spend thousands of dollars elsewhere. You did not care 
whether I lost all my stuff in storage and yet I saw you spend money elsewhere. You always hated to 
give me money for gas or want to do any repairs to my truck, yet I saw you spend money elsewhere. 
You have whined about the cost of printer paper and cartridges, which basically is the only thing I 
asked from you after I stopped asking for anything for my truck. 
The kicker is this Allen, you whine at me that you have no money and your credit cards are maxed 
out, yet you spend money for things other than your commitment to the business; and I am not talking 
about living expenses. 
Allen, you do not know how to sacrifice and commit from the heart, which is the Spirit Within, nor to 
sacrifice and commit to others physically, emotionally or spiritually and that is sad. You always have 
strings attached, ways that it must profit you in some manner. 
Remember it was you who screamed at me that I am not spiritual, I am not humble, that God does not 
talk to me and that only you can interpret the Scriptures properly! I carry that with me always and 
yet I have still tried so hard to help you and your family. What would President Hinckley, the rest of 
the Members of the Presidency, and the members of your ward think of you if they knew that those 
are the words you spit into peoples faces. 
Please send copies of all receipts you have regarding expenditures related to Spirit Bridle. 
Please immediately shut down the Utah business known as Supreme Cavalry. 
Please immediately shut down the web site known as www.supreme-cavalry.com 
Please immediately send the photographs that you failed to place upon the website. 
I have the computer as it has only my stuff on it and I need it and I left the wireless unit.. .1 will pay 
you for the computer at fair market value when I have the appropriate funds. 
I wish you all the blessings that Creator can heap upon you. I wish you the blessing of hearing your 
Spirit Within and thus learning to communicate with those around you. I wish the blessing of 
finding true tranquility in this life that comes from hearing the Spirit. 
Rev. Edward Allan Buck 
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